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Abstract: 
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one of the most notorious intractable conflicts of the century.  
Historically, two streams of thought have dominated the academic realm of conflict resolution and 
reconciliation efforts: those which focus on reconciling final status issues, and those which focus on 
reconceptualizing identity.  However, what has been neglected is the relationship between the two, or 
how identity affects individual’s perspectives on final status issues.  As such, I propose that through 
re-conceptualization of issues, perspectives can be altered in such a way so that final status issues are 
no longer viewed as zero-sum.  Such a re-conceptualization subsequently lays the foundations for 
more effective reconciliation and resolution efforts as both sides can envision potential gains.  While 
this in itself is not an all-encompassing solution due to the dynamism of the conflict, when used in 
conjunction with other methods it provides yet another opportunity for open discussion and debate 
concerning resolution and reconciliation. 
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Introduction 
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one of the most notorious intractable conflicts of the century.  
Historically, two streams of thought have dominated the academic realm of conflict resolution and 
reconciliation efforts: those which focus on reconciling final status issues, and those which focus on 
reconceptualizing identity.  However, what has been neglected is the relationship between the two, or 
how identity affects individual’s perspectives on final status issues.  As such, I propose that through 
re-conceptualization of issues, perspectives can be altered in such a way so that final status issues are 
no longer viewed as zero-sum.  Such a re-conceptualization subsequently lays the foundations for 
more effective reconciliation and resolution efforts as both sides can envision potential gains.  While 
this in itself is not an all-encompassing solution due to the dynamism of the conflict, when used in 
conjunction with other methods it provides yet another opportunity for open discussion and debate 
concerning resolution and reconciliation. 
Main Text 
Identities are of pivotal importance because they allow individuals to situation themselves 
within, and understand their relation to, the wider world. Identity is constructed and maintained in two 
ways: by an individual’s interactions with others, and through membership in reference groups.  
According to Cooley’s concept of the ‘Looking Glass Self’, the bulk of an individual’s self-identity is 
developed based on social interactions.245  This becomes an important fact to remember when studying 
intractable conflicts, as negatively-perceived interactions between two opposing groups undoubtedly 
contribute to the conflict’s perpetuation.  Secondarily, reference groups – groups defined by similar 
worldviews, characteristics, and/or values – offer individuals the opportunity to ascend past individual 
self-identity and towards a collective group identity.246  Reference groups can be formed on virtually 
any basis – ethnicity, nationality, religion, gender, etc. – and thus often intersect and overlap, for so 
long as two reference groups are not in direct opposition to one another - necessitating oppositional 
                                                          
245 Elbedour et al., “Identity Formation in the Shadow of Conflict: Projective Drawings by Palestinian and Israeli Arab 
Children from the West Bank and Gaza,” 219 
246 Shibutani and Rothman, from Ibid 
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definitions - an individual can ascribe to a variety of reference groups.247  Due to their exclusivity, 
reference groups inherently create ‘in-groups’, those who are part of the specific reference group, and 
‘out-groups’, those who are not.  In situations of conflict, the out-group is typically vilified and de-
legitimized.248 
Perhaps most importantly, membership in a reference group provides an individual with a 
specific ‘collective narrative’, i.e. a way to understand the world in a meaningful, organized, and 
predictable way.249  Existing outside of a linear time frame, they aim to tie “…at least two real or 
fictive events or situations in [a] time sequence, neither of which presupposes or entails the other.”250  
In simpler terms, collective narratives attempt to identify themes within real-world events which 
explain and bolster the reference group’s understanding of the world.  Presented through popular 
culture (e.g. television), myths, rituals (e.g. holidays), and biased accounts of specific events,251 
collective narratives shun ambiguity, focusing instead on “…enduring beliefs shared by society 
members…”252  For example, the 1948 war is understood very differently by the Israelis and the 
Palestinians.  Known as the ‘War of Independence’ by Israelis, in Israeli school curricula the Arabs are 
established as the aggressors and there is little (if any) mention of the Palestinian refugees created as a 
result.  Oppositely, the Palestinians understand The Catastrophe (al-Nakbah) as the beginning of a war 
of aggression against their national identity, and focus heavily on the resulting refugee population the 
conflict created.  Here, the Israelis are depicted as the aggressors and accorded full responsibility for 
creating the refugee problem.253 
Collective narratives are also dynamic: they do not just re-tell the past, but shape the future by 
ascribing moral judgments on information/events.254  By assigning a moral judgment (e.g. truth or lie, 
good or bad), collective narratives directly shape individual/group perception re: specific situations.  
With this in mind, astute actors can then use collective narratives to individual/group emotions, 
persuade public opinion, and thus control real-world reactions. In conflict situations, dominant 
political actors on either side go to extreme measures to ensure that the dominant narrative bolsters 
their own position and that alternative/counter-narratives are not given any ground to stand on, lest 
these counter-narratives create or exacerbate existing internal cleavages.  Stagnation, inertia, and/or 
apathy additionally make the in-group’s narrative more susceptible to doubts, which also threaten 
cohesion.255  We saw this behaviour in the previous example of the 1948 conflict: Israelis know the 
conflict as the ‘War of Independence’, which evokes ideas of an oppressed minority overcoming 
seemingly insurmountable obstacles to fight for and win their independence.  No mention is made of 
the adversary’s narrative or motivations; they are simply a one-dimensional ‘aggressor’ against which 
the justified in-group struggles.  
In his 1984 study on Reciprocal Interaction Effects, Kaplowitz demonstrates the interaction 
between perceptions and reality.  He posits that, depending on the capabilities and ideologies of those 
involved, an actor can strategize a plan which aims to create a specific outcome.  In his analysis, 
Kaplowitz provides five roles which states assume: totalist, long-run totalist, competitive use of 
force/deterrent-punitive, firm but cooperative, and conciliatory.  Each of these roles exhibit specific 
characteristics; for example, (long-run) totalists believe that only through the annihilation of the out-
group can security be ensured.256  He argues that, if the in-group state knows the roles both itself and 
                                                          
247 Elbedour et al. note that “[w]hen two reference groups are in conflict, or competing for the same resource, individuals 
[define] themselves both in terms of their membership to their own group, as well as in reference to the other group. (220) 
248 Bar-Tal and Salomon, Narratives of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 8; Aharon Bizman and Michael Hoffman. 
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the out-group state ascribe to, as well as the (military/social) capabilities each state have at their 
disposal, then the in-group can ascertain the tangible costs and benefits, and choose their response 
accordingly.257  Let us use the example of a conflict involving a totalist versus a competitive use of 
force/deterrent-punitive: if the totalist is more powerful, she will attempt to overrun its adversary, 
whereas if power parity exists, the competitive use of force/deterrent-punitive state will most likely 
drive the totalist force into latency.258  Consequently, the totalist will choose whether or not to attempt 
to overrun her adversary based on her relative strength to her adversary: yes if stronger, no if weaker.  
Thus, we can see the fundamental role that collective narratives play in prolonging intractable 
conflicts.  Created and maintained by dominant societal beliefs, collective narratives shape 
individuals’/groups’ perspectives and influence them toward specific responses.  In identity-based 
conflict, this becomes even more problematic, as each group internalizes a conflict ethos259- a 
collective narrative which attributes positive acts to the in-group and negative acts to the out-group – 
and remains wholeheartedly convinced of the zero-sum nature between the two sides.  This zero-sum 
perspective has inadvertently been ascribed to the final status issues as well, due to the perceived tie 
between identities and the issues involved.  
With this in mind, any hopes of reconciliation between the two sides must include a focus on 
reconstructing each actor’s collective narratives.  This can be approached in two ways: A. by delinking 
the final status issues from identity so that they are perceived as stand-alone events as opposed to a 
part of a wider narrative; or B. by moving away from the perceived zero-sum status of these issues 
towards one open to full or partial reconciliation.  As touched upon earlier, option A would be 
extremely hard to implement due to the durability of identities and the difficulty in instigating critical 
self-analysis on a collective level.260  Therefore, Option B appears to be the more realistic choice, and 
as such is the my point of focus. 
In order to realize Option B several steps must be taken, the majority of which focus on the re-
direction of the conflict ethos towards a peace ethos which, scholars hope, will then create conditions 
conducive to understanding and reconciliation.  For this to occur, the first step must focus on the 
legitimation of the out-group’s collective narrative.261  In this case, legitimization is not synonymous 
with internalization: the in-group can objectively understand the motivations and perceptions of the 
out-group without changing its own collective narrative.262 263  However, by recognizing that the out-
group’s narrative is considered legitimate to the out-group and therefore plays a role in the conflict, 
the in-group can use this newfound understanding of the out-group to formulate a strategic response, 
as demonstrated by Kaplowitz.264 
Secondarily, a distinction must be drawn between an ideological victory and an operational 
victory.265  Both sides currently believe they would both be better off if the other did not exist; 
however, this reality is extremely unlikely to happen in the near future. As such, despite the fact that 
both sides are ideologically unwilling to sacrifice their hardened positions on the final status issues, 
they must come to terms with the realistic facts that some type of negotiations are necessary.  One way 
this can be accomplished is by subordinating the respective goals of each reference group to one 
overarching collective narrative of peace.  As previously established, collective narratives are created 
and maintained by the in-group’s social conditions and perceived history.  As such, peace movements, 
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revisionist historians, domestic media, artists, and other actors and/or forms of expression can alter 
how people perceive their collective narratives.266  We have also established that  individuals can 
belong to several reference groups (and thus adhere to several collective narratives) so long as they do 
not opposite each other.    
This new subordinate narrative must be explicit in what it will and will not provide; another 
utopian goal which proves to be unreachable would just add yet another intractable factor into the 
conflict.267  In order to realize this, both Israel and Palestine (represented by the P.A.) must also 
establish and maintain unwavering support for this superordinate collective narrative.  This includes, 
but is not limited to, accepting external support, putting down domestic opponents to peace, and 
involving social institutions in re-shaping society’s goals.268  It is one thing to preach commitment to 
peace, but another to actually institutionalize it.  Lastly, each group must be willing to look towards 
the future instead of the past; only by doing so can perceived self-victimization be avoided.269  
Creating a superordinate goal of peace does not necessitate the destruction of other collective 
narratives, but instead adds an additional tier which takes priority over the intractable positions each 
side currently hold.270  Within their smaller collective narratives, each side can internally believe that 
they alone hold the ‘right’ to the land/Jerusalem/to return, so long as peace is prioritized as the 
ultimate goal for both groups.  In this way, common ground can be established and held as neither side 
will risk any action which may jeopardize this superordinate goal.  
However, some drawbacks do exist.  First, each society must overcome the belief that 
forgiving is equivalent to forgetting.  At this point, the conflict has become so entrenched into the 
collective narratives of each respective group that it would not be feasible to expect either side to 
forget the atrocities committed against them, nor for their respective politicians to ask it.271  So long as 
neither side is willing to admit their faults – and this will continue to be the case so long as material 
power disparities exist and national identities are perceived to be at stake – true reconciliation cannot 
exist.  What this at best offers, then, is an extended opportunity for peaceful conditions that will 
hopefully evolve into conditions suitable for reconciliation, given enough time. 
Secondarily, the current material power disparities on the ground make it very difficult for the 
Palestinians to create and maintain the new superordinate collective narrative of peace.  In order for 
the superordinate narrative to become dominant, both the government and civil society must focus on 
promoting it and suppressing all attempts to deviate away from it.  For the Palestinians, this promotion 
and suppression becomes increasingly difficult: not only does the P.A.272 not have a monopoly on the 
entire Palestinian territory (since Hamas controls the Gaza Strip), but they also do not currently have 
the physical capacity in the form of police forces to stem radical behaviour. 
This leads us to the third and most controversial issue: the ‘chicken and egg’ argument of what 
comes first, material peace or narrative reconstruction.  As we have witnessed, establishing material 
peace without first addressing the underlying tensions surrounding identity issues (i.e. mutual 
recognition and legitimization) is especially difficult to generate.  The Oslo Accords, the most recent 
attempt at just that, was largely stalled by parties who still internalized the divisions between the two 
sides and refused to accept some type of compromise.273  Concurrently, narrative reconceptualization 
and reconstruction cannot occur while power disparities between the two sides remain so stark. 
Rothman and Olson note that in situations where resource allocation is unequal between sides – an 
undisputed fact in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – traditional methods are often unsuccessful because 
they do not deal with the underlying effects of structural inequalities. These structural inequalities are 
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conducive to protracted conflicts because they aggravate the security issues of either side, making 
each side feel more vulnerable.  In turn, this vulnerability leads each side to harden their own 
positions, lest they put themselves further at risk of having their interests ignored.  This results in a 
negative feedback loop, where neither side will compromise their positions in pursuit of the common 
good, as it means risking their position all-together.274 Additionally, as mentioned, states who do not 
hold a monopoly on violence cannot ensure the predominance of the peaceful superordinate identity, 
which undermines the collective narrative reconstruction.275  Therefore, we once again are introduced 
to a seemingly intractable situation where both methods of resolution and reconciliation require the 
other to be implemented first in order to ensure their success.   
Conclusion 
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a complex, multi-faceted issue which concerns a variety of 
overlapping issues, including those of both material distribution and identity.  In this paper, I have 
attempted to introduce an additional method for creating conditions suitable for establishing resolution 
and reconciliation: the reconceptualization of final status issues. In my proposal, I have attempted to 
mesh these two considerations together by asserting that a reconceptualization of final status issues, so 
that they are not perceived as zero-sum nor associated with national identity security, may provide 
additional room for common ground to be found.  
In closing, I would suggest that both material peace and narrative reconstruction should be 
pursued simultaneously.  This will allow the flexibility necessary for the Palestinians to establish 
stronger domestic institutions, and for both sides to warm to the idea of compromise for the sake of 
peace.276  The reconceptualization of final status issues will assure both sides that their national 
identities are not in jeopardy, thus prompting them to enter into negotiations and make compromises, 
as these would no longer be synonymous with the eradication of their identities, thus providing an 
opportunity for common ground and positive steps forward to be established.  While 
reconceptualization is not an exclusive solution to the peace, it does offer an additional perspective 
that may be successfully employed alongside other measures. 
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